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A failure of voluntarism :the case of joint health 
and safety committees in Britain 
P.B. Beaumont* and J.W. Leopold** 
This paper sets out the history of the attempt to establish voluntary health and safety 
committees in Britain, their failure and the attempt to legislate for their development. The 
impact of this legislation is analysed and the paper concludes by presenting a framework, 
which it is argued, would be developed for analysing tlze impact of legislation in Britain 
and in other countries such as New Zealand. 
Introduction 
A much quoted observation of Phelps Brown {1959, p.355) in the late 1950s was that 
"When British industrial relations are compared with those of the other democracies, they 
stand out because they are so little regulated by law". However, the position has changed 
so substantially since then that Lewis {1976, p.15) was able to comment that "In 1975 it 
would seem that the one indubitably fundamental and irreversible trend is the ,ever-
increasing extent of th~e legal regulation of the British system of industrial relations". In 
view of this substantially changed state of affairs in Britain, a fundam~ental task for 
industrial relations scholars is to, first, identify the reasons for this change, and then 
secondly, to consider the impact and implications of this cl1ange for union-management 
relations at the national level and, perhaps more importantly, at the level of the individual 
employment establishment. These questions are not, of course, unique to the British 
system in that they are obviously relevant to any industrial relations system where such 
legislative based changes have come about, particularly over a relatively short space of time. 
Accordingly, this paper seeks to take a first step in the direction of trying to answer the 
above two questions by means of a specific illustration, namely the history of the attempt 
to ~establish joint health and safety committees on a comprehensive basis in Britain. 
Specifically, the paper documents the failure to bring about the establishment of such 
committees on a voluntary basis, which produced, in turn, the attempt to legislate for 
their development. The impact of this legislation is then documented, and finally we 
conclude by presenting a framework of analysis that seems potentially valuable in trying 
to account for variation in th,e response to such industrial relations legislation at the level 
of the individual employment establishment. Th,e potential value of this framework of 
analysis is that it can be used to consider the impact of any industrial relations law giving 
new rights to unionised employees in any system of industrial relations. In this sense much 
of the material presented here can be seen to transcend the particular organis~tional 
structure discussed here (a joint health and safety committee), and indeed the British 
system of industrial relations. However, before proceeding to our specific discussion of 
joint health and safety committees we present an overview of the British industrial 
relations system and the major challenges and changes to that system that occurred during 
the course of the 1970s. 
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The Traditional System: and ...,.. 
The traditional system of industrial relations in Britain, whose hi&h po1Dt was the inter-
war and immediate post World War D years, was characterised by voluatary cOIIectiw 
bargaining conducted very larpJy at the industry level by various multi-union and multi-
employer negotiating bodies. However, during the 1970s virtually all of these 
aspects of the British industrial relations system were either changed to a substantial 
extent, or at least were exposed to serious challenges, in some for the first tinte. Thia 
period of time witnessed, for example, a continuing strong moveJtlent away froJft industry 
level, multi-employer bargaining arrangements towards those of single-employer bargainina 
conducted at the plant, and to a lesser extent the company, level; this bargaining structure 
change being that recommended in the report of the Donovan Commission in 1968. 
Furthermore, these years saw the establishment and report of the Bullock Committee of 
Inquiry on board level worker representation, which represented the fust really serious 
challenge to the long accepted proposition in British industrial relations that collective 
bargaining was both a necessary and sufficient condition for industrial democracy. In this 
particular case, it was felt that collective bargaining needed at least to be supplemented by 
an additional set of structural arrangements so as to ensure union influence over a wide 
range of subject matter, particularly those matters decided at company level (eg. invest-
ment strategy, product development, etc.). However the major change that we are 
concerned with here was the movement away from a strongly voluntarist system of 
collective bargaining to a system characterised by a substantial degree of legal regulation. 
The essence of the traditional voluntary system of collective bargaining in Britain was 
the preference for autonomy and self-regulation on the part of both labour and manage-
ment. This voluntarist tradition, which was at heart an anti-court, rather than an anti-
government, doctrine, came under strong challenge during the 1970s with a substantial 
degree of legal regulation being introduced into the system of industrial relations. The early 
1970s, for example, witnessed the passage of the EqUill Pay Act, the Trade Union tmd 
Labour Relations Act, the Industry Act, the Employment Protection Act, the Sex Discrim-
ination Act, the Race Relation Act and the Health tmd Safety at Work Act. In order 
to more fully understand the essential nature of this legislative programme one can make 
use of Kahn-Freund's (1969) perspective on the nature of labour relations law. According 
to Kahn-Freund, there are three basic functions of labour law:-
(1) being auxiliary to, or assisting the processes of collective bargaining, 
(2) restricting or constraining collective bargaining activities, and 
(3) regulating or providing statutory standards in areas which might be subjected to 
collective bargaining. 
The legislative' programme of the 1970s was very much a mixture of auxiliary and 
regulatory law. That is, in contrast to the traditional system where there had been very 
little law and what existed was essentially negative in character, we now fmd a system of 
industrial relations in which both individual employees and unions (as organisational 
entities) have a variety of positive, legal rights of both a substantive and procedural kind. 
These legislative developments particularly reflected the influence of membership of the 
EEC; indeed some parts of the legislative programme in Britain (eg. Part IV of the 
Employment Protection Act 1975) were taken straight from EEC Directives on the particu-
. lar subject of concern. These legislative developments can, at least in some sense, be seen as 
an attempt to develop something of a 'European model' of industrial relations in Britain. 
There have been varied management reactions to this programme of industrial relations 
law which can, at the risk of some over-simplification, be usefully grouped into three basic 
categories. The first group would argue that this legislative programme has scarcely affected 
them at all. This is because it has simply made obligatory for all fli1DI those which 
'enlightened employers' like themselves have long observed. In the longer term, these 
,. 
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employers would argue that both unions and management will benefit, for exan1ple, from 
a formal disciplinary process, the keeping of detailed personnel records, and, above all, 
from a more responsible approach to staff recruitment. The second group would argue that 
in the long term these benefits will certainly come about, but that too large a volume of 
legislation was passed in too short a time period, so that inevitably there have been some 
short-run costs to th~e programme. As one such Managing Director argued: "UK legislation 
only brings us into line with what the Germans, for ~example, have had for decades. The 
problem is that tl1e bulk of our employment protection laws have been introduced in the 
past three years, and you just can't compress ~Germany's thirty years of statutes into three 
years. There are bound to be hiccoughs." (Rees and Robinson, 1979, p.30) The third and 
final category of managetnent response would be that this legislative programm~e has 
essentially been a bad thing in that it has caused managers to grow cautious in their recruit-
ment and companies to employ fewer people; the detailed administrative procedures now 
requir~ed of companies threaten, rath~er than ~enhance, good industrial r~elations, and it has 
shifted the balance of power too much in favour of the trade union movement. 
In order to try and provide some detailed empirical perspective on management 
attitudes to this legislative programme the Department of Employment commissioned a 
survey by the Policy Studies Institute. The basic conclusion of this survey exercise, which 
was conducted in 1977, was as follows: 
, 
The main finding to emerge from the study was really how modest had been 
the influence of an apparently ,mlljor package of employment legislation. Many 
employers had developed policies and practices which wer~e in advance of the 
minimum standards specified in the legislation. Many oth~ers, for whom this 
was not the case, were able to continue much as before, presumably due to the 
lack of people at th~eir workplaces with the knowledge or inclination to draw 
attention to the law or invoke its requirements. (Daniel and Stilgoe, 1978, p.84) 
· One can develop the contents of this quote further by suggesting that the workings and 
impact of any industrial relations legislation (which provid~es new rights for unionised 
employees), at the level of the individual union-management relationship will depend, 
almost as a matter of definition, on the following factors: 
(I) The position with regard to these rights at the individual ,establishment prior to the 
passa"ge of the legislation. 
(2) The overall nature and quality of the individual union-management relationship into 
which these new rights are injected. 
(3) The ~extent and way in which the unions choose to exercise th~ese new rights. 
It is the natur~e of factor (I) above that w~e wish to explore more fully in this paper. In 
relation to this particular factor, one can broadly distinguish the positions of three basic 
sub-groups of firms. 
(i) Those firms where the rights and arrangements embodied in the legislation have in 
fact been established on a voluntary basis well before the passage of the legislation. 
Indeed, it is frequently the arrangem,ents and practices in this sub-group of "best-
practice" firms that has shaped the content of legislation and codes of practice in 
Britain. 
(ii) Those firms that, when legislation on particular rights and arrangements is either 
imminent or has just been passed, move quickly to comply with its stipulated 
conditions. 
(iii) Those firms who only get round to establishing the arrangements called for in the 
legislation after a considerable period of time has elapsed. 
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In the remainder of tbls we the (alld 
"establishment response'' in dle fint two cateaortes set CJ11t &bow. Thts ts 
examining, first, the histaty of the attempt te establlskjoiBt lteeltllaad lllfety 
on a voluntary basis, and then movJng on to coaat.der the aatare of the reapoaee to the 
legislation that was ultimately introduced in this area. The first cateaory of Ia 
taken up in the next section of the paper. 
The Place of Joint Health and Safety Committees: The Voluntary 
The attempt to encourage the voluntary establishment of joint health and safety 
committees dates back at least to the euly decades of this century. For example, as early 
as 1913 the Factory Inspectorate stated that: 
the experience of several British and American fums shows that, in addition to 
legal safeguards, reduction of accidents can best be secured by obtaining the 
interest and co-operation of operatives and officials through safety committees. 
The number and . constitution of such committees will depend on the size of 
the factory and the nature of the industry . . . the duties of these committees 
are to study the causes of accidents, to suggest and devise suitable means for 
preventing them, to keep careful records, to make frequent inspection of 
machinery and plant, and to note any defects and dangers. After some 
experience the principal safety committee usually drafts a code of safety rules 
applicable to the particular industry ... (Williams, 1960, p.188) 
In addition to the continual urging of the Factory Inspectorate, the TUC and the central 
employer body at the particular time have also issued joint statements in favour of the 
voluntary establishment of such committees. However, despite all this verbal encourage-
ment the extent of progress in the voluntary establishment of joint health and safety 
committees was for long considered unsatisfactory. A Report of the Industrial Safety 
Sub-Committee of the National Joint Advisory Council of the Ministry of labour in the 
mid-1950s revealed that there were " ... committees of some kind with functions covering 
safety ... " in about 60 percent of factories with more than 500 employees, in about 25 
percent of factories with between 250 and 500 workers, in less than 10 percent of factories 
with between 100 and 250 workers and were almost non-existent in factories with less than 
100 employees. {Williams, 1960, p.197) 
This evidence of the lack of progress in establishing such committees, combined with a 
rising accident rate over the period 1963-1969, led to union demands for changes to the 
Factories Acts which would provide for statutory based joint health and safety 
committees. For example, at the annual meeting of the TUC in 1964 we fmd a representa-
tive of the Amalgamated Union of Foundry Workers moving the following mot~on: 
Congress declares that in order to provide effective safety organisation in 
industry, the Factories Act should be amended to provide for: 
(a) the election of safety delegates, with powen of inspection, by the 
workers concerned in factories: such powen of inspection to include the 
right to inspect the scene of an accident and the equipment involved, a 
right at present avallable only to miners under the Mines and Quarries 
Act 1954 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
the setting up of safety committees in factories 
the right of workers' safety delegates to accompany the factory inspector 
on his visits to factories 
the advice of the factory inspector to the fu1n to be available to the 
safety committee or safety delegates. 
ladle yeara 
... of &tate •• 
tafety aa•11htioa t1ae r.,... 
that the had -
be ao dnelopu.at of joint What we 
ue atatutmy workshop of the ldnd that operate in Sweden." 
Althoqh the TUC to pUih for the introduction of statutory u••aae 1111t1 
the Swedish liMB from the mid-19601 their d8inands did not lead to any ......... 
chanaes. They did, however, result in two surveys by the Factory 
1967 and 1969 which we~e deatped to pro~de detailed information on the exteat llf 
establishment. The latter survey, for example, revealed that in total only 27 per-
of the plants surveyecl had a joint health and safety committee, although a further 
percent did haw a paeral consultative committee that discussed health and atety 
. There was also found to be considerable inter-industry variation in the extent to 
o'V&A joint health and safety committees had been established; the range being from a 
of nine percent of plants in clothing and footwear to a high of 56 percent of establish-
in gas, electricity and water. These voluntarily established committees tended to be 
••v&ai .• "'., concentrated in large plants and in the high accident rate industries. 
In addition to these survey returns, the Ministry of Labour published, in 1968, a study 
the detailed workings of 20 such joint safety committees. This study indicated that 
these committees typically meet once a month and tended to discuss accidents and 
Jncidents which might have caused accidents, the safety of plant and machinery, gangways 
IIDd the conditions of floors, methods of material handling, fue precautions and the use of 
p-otective clothing and footwear. It was found that the members of these committees had 
:rarely received any specialised training, and that there was very little feedback of the 
eolllmittee workings and decisions to the workforce. These committees were found to be 
-·· , ...... to operate where the general climate of union-management relations was unsatis-
' and a number of more specific problems, such as poor communication, 
tisfaction with the balance of representation and an inadequate provision of necessary 
info1ntation were also revealed. The committees included in this study were very much 
advisory bodies. They were rarely allowed to investigate accidents at the time of 
occurrence, or to undertake inspections of the workplace. Such functions were very much 
the responstbility of the management appointed safety officer. 
The Labour government's eventual response to the results of the two factory inspector-
ate surveys, and the TUCs continuing pressure for the establishment of statutory based 
safety committees, was the introduction of the Employed Persons (Health and Safety) BiQ 
in February 1970. This Bill allowed the appointment by a trade union "recognised for the 
purpose of negotiating ternts and conditions of employment" of safety representatives at 
all factories with more than 10 workers. The functions of these safety representatives were 
to be to promote co-operation between managers and workers in achieving safe and healthy 
working conditions, and to carry out inspections in the interests of the workforce. The 
safety representatives were to have the right to make inspections every three months, or 
more frequently in the case of accidents, and were to have access to all relevent documents 
which the employer was required to keep under the terms of the Factories Act. These 
safety representatives were to be persons with five years' employment in the industry, over 
23 years of age and if possible with two years' employment at the factory concerned. In all 
factories with 100 employees, management was to be required to set up a joint safety 
committee if requested to do so by the safety representatives. Although this Bill did not, 
as some unions had hoped, give the safety representatives the right to call in the factory 
inspector and haw work stopped in the event of a serious accident it still aroused consider-
.able employer opposition. 
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However, with Parliament being in June 1970 the BIU c.Ud not reach 
~tatute book and the Conservative Gowmment which took office to carry on 
1t. Instead they stated their intention to await the report of the Robeua Committee 
Workplace Health and Safety (1970-72) which had been set up by the Labour 
tion. The report of the Robens Committee, while conceding that a statutory 
requiring the appointment of safety representatives and safety committees might 
advantageous, refused to recommend such a provision on the grounds that it might-·-· 
"too rigid" or "too narrow'' in concept. In their view the best way to proceed would be 
impose on employers a geneml duty to consult about joint safety arrange111ents. Fvuu 
this report the Conservatives presented a Bill on healtJt and safety at work to 
in January 1974. This Bill was largely based on the report of the Robens Commi--.. 
although it conceded even less in the way of union involvement. However, the Bill 
overtaken by the General Election of the following month and when the Labour 
was returned to power it passed the Health and Safety at Work Act in 1974. 
The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 
The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (HASAWA 1974) provided an update 
previous health and safety at work statutes and regulations, and extended statutory safety 
protection to some five million workers not covered by the existing Factory Act 1961 and 
the Office, Shops and Railway Premises Act 1963. It is an enabling Act which imposes 
broad general duties on employers and employees and allows the newly created Health and 
Safety Commission to bring forward various pieces of detailed legislation to cover specific 
areas within the broad health and safety field. 
The basic aim of the Act is to create an essentially self-regulatory system for the 
adoption and observance of safety and health standards and regulations. This approach 
follows from the Robens Committee's contention that previously too much responsibility 
for the adoption and observance of workplace health and safety standards had been placed 
on the law and external inspectorates and too little on employees and management. 
The Act for the first time created a general statutory right for workplace health and 
safety representatives and safety committees to be created and placed a general duty on 
employers to consult with these representatives (HASAWA Act S2 (6),2 (7)). The Act 
was later modified by the Employment Protection Act 1975 so that the safety representa-
tives would be chosen solely by recognised trade unions. The detailed rights and powers of 
safety representatives required the implementation of the Safety Representatives and 
Safety Committee Regulations 1977, which came into force on 1 October 1978 after a 
considerable period of delay due largely to financial pressure on local authorities. 
However, from 1 October 1978 independent trade unions recognised for the purposes of 
collective bargaining could appoint safety representatives whom the employer was legally 
bound to recognise. The method of selection, the representatives chosen and the areas they 
were to cover were the prerogative of the recognised trade unions, the only proviso being 
that the person(s) chosen should as far as possible have had two years experience in the 
type of employment. 
Once appointed, trade union safety representatives had extensive rights. These were to 
investigate potential hazards and dangerous occurrences at the workplace; to examine the 
causes of accidents at the workplace; to investigate complaints from employees; to make 
representations on investigations etc to the employer; to conduct inspections under certain 
statutory regulations; to represent employees in consultation with Factory Inspectors; to 
receive certain information from inspectors; and, to attend meetings of safety committees. 
In order to fulfil these functions representatives are allowed time off work for training and 
in order to carry out their job they are allowed further time off with pay. In addition to 
these rights two or more safety representatives can request the establishment of a joint 
health and safety committee. If they do this, then the employer must establish the 
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committee within three months and furthermore must consult with the representatives of 
recognised trade unions about the function and remit of the proposed committee. 
With the implementation of the SRSC Regulations on 1 October 1978 extensive 
statutory backing was given to th~e creation of both safety representatives and safety 
committees. Although the Regulations had been delay~ed for nearly two years they were 
known in outline for most of that period. Indeed many trade unions pressed for th~eir 
voluntary implementation before the official date and as our next section shows there is 
evidence that many employers accepted such union requests and set up arrangements 
voluntarily in the shadow of the impending legislation. 
It is to an analysis of the implementation of these statutory rights that w~e now turn, 
using data from two surveys that have been carried out. The data employed here derives 
from (i) the Warwick University Industrial Relations Research Unit Survey of 970 plants 
which was conducted betw~een December 1977 and January 1978, and (ii) a survey of 
6,630 workplaces conducted by the Health and Safety Executive in the course of their 
routine inspections in October 1979. The first survey only concerns joint health and safety 
committees, while the latter survey also examines the appointment of safety representa-
tives. It is to this latter issue that we now turn. 
The Appointment of Health and Safety R~epresentatives 
The Health and Safety Executive's survey covered 6,630 workpla~ces, employing nearly 
half a million people. However, the majority of workplaces in the survey had less than 50 
employees and significantly, given our earlier finding on size of firm, very few safety rep-
resentatives had b~e~en appointed in such plants. On the other hand when we consider 
people at work, rather than workplaces, we find that over thr~ee-quarters of all ~employees 
were repr~esented by a safety representative. The ~effect of plant size on the lik~elihood (or 
not) of having a safety representative is summarised in Table 1 below . 
• 
Table 1 Safety representatives in workplaces classified by size 
Size band 
(number of employees) 
1- 10 
11- 25 
26- 50 
51- 100 
101- 150 
251- 500 
501-l ,000 
1,001 plusj 
All 
Number of 
workplaces surveyed 
3,758 
1,190 
670 
406 
294 
137 
77 
98 
6,630 
Source: Department of Employm~ent gazette FebrUllry 1981. 
'Workplaces with 
safety representatives 
appointed under regulations 
No. P~ercent 
99 3 
157 13 
199 30 
204 51 
207 70 
114 83 
71 92 
90 92 
1,141 17 
Thus we can see clearly that the larger the plant, the more likelihood there was of there 
being a safety representative. In fact, the majority of medium-sized and large firms do have 
safety representatives. In accounting for this siz·e influence we must remember that under 
the Regulations it is independent recognised trade unions which alone have the rigl1t to 
appoint safety representatives. And, as there is a well established strong correlation 
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Table 2 Safety 
ef 
ill Number of 
Averap 
anmberof 
workplacea workplaces employees UDda' with safety SIC order 
IDIV8)'ed surveyed per 1811datlo• repre•~tnes 
Agriculture, forestry, 
rllhing (a) 5,595 1,129 s 1 15 Mining and quarrying (b) 13,282 314 42 47 85 Food, drUnk, tobacco 26,766 141 190 37 10 Coal & Petroleum products 3,879 14 277 64 81 Chentical & allied industries 42,699 113 378 so 83 Metal manufacture 55,228 123 449 51 94 Mechanical engineering 27,395 273 100 22 80 Instrument engineering 1,338 31 43 7 43 Electrical engineering 21,541 107 201 33 88 Shipbuilding 5,423 29 187 21 92 Vehicles 57,780 83 696 45 81 Metal goods not elsewhere 
specified 16,059 356 4S 18 68 Textiles 15,282 110 139 38 80 
Leather, leather goods & fur 146 10 IS 0 0 Clothing & footwNr 8,128 118 69 12 60 
Bricks, pottery, cement, 
glass 7,966 108 74 23 74 
Timber, furniture, etc 6,724 206 33 11 67 
Paper, printing & publishing 18,654 173 108 38 88 
Other manufacturing 
industries 31,312 152 206 23 88 
Construction 43,181 1,912 23 4 58 
Gas, water & electricity 1,446 54 27 67 90 
Transport & 
communication (c) 7,784 42 185 38 98 
Distributive trades (wholesale 
& retail) (d) 3,631 148 
Insurance, banking & business 
2S 17 67 
services (e) 104 3 3S 0 0 
Professional & scientific 
services (0 4S,8Sl 240 191 54 82 
Miscellaneous services (g) 9,944 526 19 8 54 
Public administration & 
defence 9,630 115 84 61 74 
All 486,765 6,630 73 17 79 
Notes: 
(a) The sample consists mainly or entirely of agricultural premises. 
(b) The sample includes no coal mines, since these are outside the scope of the regulations. 
(c) The sample excludes premises subject to inspection by the Railway Inspectorate. 
(d) Many workplaces within this Order are subject to local authority inspection. 
(e) Workplaces within this Order are mostly subject to local authority inspection - hence tiny 
sample. 
(0 This Order includes hospitals and educational establishments. 
(g) Some workplaces within this Order are subject to local authority inspection. 
between size of workplace and union recognition, it is the absence of union recognition 
in small plants that is likely to account, at least partially, for the absence of safety 
representatives . 
• 
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As Table 2 reveals construction and agricultur~e accounted for just under half of the 
workplaces surveyed, but only five percent of these workplaces had h~ealth and safety 
representatives and consequently this depressed the overall proportion of workplaces with 
safety representatives. Without these two industry orders, the percentage having safety 
representatives would rise from 17 percent to 29 percent. These two orders are character-
ised by small plants and low levels of unionisation. Among the other industry orders, the 
low accident rate, low unionised industries of leather, clothing and footw~ear, and instru-
ment engineering are also the industries which have not invoked the Regulations. At the 
other end of the league gas, water and electricity is the industry with most safety repre-
sentatives, with the high accident rate industries such as metal manufacture and coal and 
petrol~eum also among the leading industry orders with safety representatives. 
There are some discrepancies between th·e league position of workplaces with safety 
representatives and the percentage of employees in workplaces with safety representatives. 
For ~example workers in transport and cotnmunication had the high~est percentage of 
coverage (98 percent) but were much lower down in terms of workplaces covered. 
Similarly, only 21 percent of workplaces in shipbuilding had safety representatives but 
those that did, covered 92 percent of the work~ers concerned. Clearly from these figures 
a small number of workers in these industry groups are not covered but these workers are 
spread over a large number of small plants. One other area of note is the high percentage 
of safety representatives in both professional and scientific services and public administra-
tion and defence . These orders largely cover public-sector employment where the govern-
ment, the instigator of legislation, is employer. They are also areas of high union density 
and these two factors are likely to give figures for safety representation well beyond what 
might have been anticipat~ed on the basis of the low accident risk in that type of 
employment. 
The Impact of Legislation on H~ealth and Safety Co1nmittees 
Safety representatives were an entirely new concept in British industrial relations when 
introduced by the 1974 HASAW Act, but as we have seen, voluntary joint health and 
safety committees have a long history. What, then, was the impact of the legislation on 
their establishment? 
The first evidence on this question came from th·e Warwick University Industrial 
Relations Research Unit Survey of 970 establishments. This was conducted between 
December 1977 and January 1978 and therefore predates the implen1entation of the SRSC 
Regulations by almost a year. However, the detail of the impending legislation was already 
known and thus this survey allows us to consider the impact of the legislation before it was 
finally implemented. The results revealed that fully 82.1 percent of the 970 establishments 
surveyed stated that they had a health and safety committee. However, nearly 45 percent 
of these committees had only been established after the publication of the HASA W Bill 
1974. The d·etailed results for individual industries are set out in Table 3. 
The results of this survey confirm the basic conclusions of the 1967 and 1969 Factory 
Inspectorate surveys, namely that plants in high accident risk industries were more likely 
to voluntarily ~establish health and safety committees. Thus shipbuilding and metal manu-
facture top our list of voluntarily established committees, while the low risk industry 
groups, leather and clothing and footwear come out bottom of our league table. Even 
under the shadow of the legislation, as column 3 shows, it is these san1e low risk industries 
which still do not all have committees. 
Similar results were found in the 1979 Health and Safety Executive Survey which took 
place exactly one year after the implementation of the Regulations. They found the size 
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Table 3 Joint health and lfl{ety committee~ by illdultry (percent) 
Committees 
established 
Voluntarily since pubBcation No. Total Industry established of the 1974 Bm committees establilbmenta (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Food, drink and tobacco 40.0 43.6 1S.S 110 Coal and petroleum 40.0 60.0 
- s Chemicals 50.7 37.7 11.6 69 Metal manufacture 59.2 27.6 10.5 76 Mechanical engineering 45.8 34.4 18.8 96 Instrument engineering 52.9 29.4 17.7 17 Electrical engineering 38.5 43.8 14.6 96 Shipbuilding 81.8 
- 18.2 11 Vehicles 53.7 32.8 13.4 61 Metal goods not elsewhere 
specified 39.0 42.1 19.0 95 Textiles 53.0 28.8 18.2 66 Leather, leather goods and fur 18.2 54.6 27.3 11 
aothing and footwPAtr 17.9 47.8 32.8 67 Bricks, pottery, glass, cement 44.0 44.0 12.0 25 Timber, furniture 40.6 28.1 31.3 32 Paper, printing and publishing 47.1 29.9 23.0 87 Other manufacturing 47.5 32.5 17.5 40 
Total 44.4 36.7 17.9 970 
variable to be important in that the majority of all workplaces surveyed in the 251-500 
employee range, and larger, had a safety committee before the regulations took effect. 
Table 4 shows the industry breakdown of safety committees in those workplaces where the 
survey had found safety representatives. Again the tendency is for workplaces in industry 
orders with a high accident risk to be more likely to have safety committees than those in 
the less risky industries. It is also clear that in the manufacturing industry sector these same 
industries are the ones most likely to have established safety committees as a result of the 
Regulations. Thus half the committees in clothing and footwear and 40 percent in 
electrical engineering were established after the Regulations. The impact of the Regulations 
in public sector industries is even more marked. Well over half of the committees in gas, 
electricity and water, public administration and defence, and professional and scientific 
services were established as a result of the Regulations. 
Another possible outcome of the impact of legislation is that existing (voluntarily 
established) committee arrangements can be significantly altered. In the case of health and 
safety committees this could include the inclusion of trade union safety representatives 
instead of, or as well as, employee representatives, more regular meetings, changes in size, 
or changes in the level of management involvement. The Health and Safety Executive 
survey shows that an average of 20 percent of health and safety committees had been 
altered as a result of the Regulations. Again there was a degree of inter industry variation 
in this as is detailed in column 3 of Table 4. 
The Health and Safety Executive survey also revealed variations in provision related to 
size of establishment. In every size range, the majority of workplaces with safety represent-
atives also had safety committees. This was more so in the larger workplaces, but also 
surprisingly in the very smallest. There was also a marked tendency for larger (i.e. over SOl 
employees) workplaces to have more than one safety committee, more often as not in a 
tiered structure. However, it is important to note that there is an inverse relationship 
between size of establishment and the existence of a safety committee as a result of the 
Regulations. Thus fully 60 percent of establishments with less than 10 employees with 
. 
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safety committe s established them after 1978, compared to only 16 percent of those 
establishments with over 1 ,000 employees. Th~e opposite relationship holds for committees 
alter~ed as a result of the Regulations. This was more likely to have happened in larger 
establishments where from our earlier evidence it is more likely that committees existed 
to be altered. 
Table 4 Safety committees in workplaces with safety representatives 
classified by industry 
SIC order 
Coal and petroleum products 
Shipbuilding 
Instrument engineering 
Gas, electricity and water 
Chemicals ,and allied industries 
Mines and quarries 
Distributive trades 
Vehicles 
Food drink and tobacco 
' Transport and communication 
Other manufacturing industries 
Bricks, pottery, glass, cement 
Metal manufacture 
Textiles 
Metal goods nes 
Electrical engineering 
Mechanical engineering 
MisceJJaneous services 
Paper, printing and publishing 
Oothing and ~ootwear 
Agriculture, forestry and fiShing 
Construction 
Timber and furniture 
Percentage of 
workplaces (a) 
which had a 
safety committee(s) 
(1) 
100 (b) 
100 (c) 
100 (d) 
97 
97 
96 
95 
95 
94 
94 
94 
'92 
'90 
90 
88 
86 
82 
77 
75 
71 
70 (e) 
~69 
65 
Public administration and defence 64 
Professional and ~scientific 
• 48 sem.ces 
Overall 81 
Notes: 
Percentage of 
workplaces (a) with a 
safety committee(s) 
wher~e the committee 
resulted from the 
regulations 
(2) 
22 
17 
0 
54 
13 
51 
35 
29 
29 
33 
30 
30 
1'9 
18 
39 
40 
32 
48 
29 
50 
70 
59 
53 
56 
58 
39 
(a) Workplaces where safety representatives had been appointed. 
(b) A small sample of six ~establishments. 
(c) A small sample of two establishments. 
(d) A :small sample of ten establishments. 
(e) A small sample of nine establishments. 
Percentage of 
workplaces (a) with a 
safety committee(s) 
where the committee 
was altered as result 
of the 
r~egulations 
(3) 
11 
33 
50 
9 
38 
12 
30 
17 
29 
6 
24 
26 
23 
21 
19 
23 
18 
23 
27 
20 
30 
14 
27 
24 
24 
20 
These then wer~e the basic fmdings of the two large scale surveys carried out in Britain 
after the passing of the Health an,d Safety at Work Act which studied the ilnpact of that 
legislation. There were clearly consid~erable inter-industry variations in this impact. We 
have suggested some of the possible reasons for this: accident risk, plant size, union 
density, public and private sector. It is to a further analysis of the impact of these and 
other ~explanatory variables that we now turn, hopetully to suggest a model to study the 
impact of industrial relations legislation that will be of use not only in Britain but also in 
other systems. 
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Modelling Variations in the Impact of 1 RelatioDI Law 
As we saw in previous sections it is relatively easy to come up with a number of ad hoc 
factors that appear to be related to variation in the response to industrial relations legisla-
tion. In this regard one frequently rmds the suggestion that large sized plants will be amons 
the leading responders to legislation, although the exact reason for this size influence is 
rarely spelled out in any detail. Moreover, it is not always clear whether it is the influence 
of size per se, or rather the fact that size is positively and significantly correlated with a 
number of other, potential influences, such as the extent of workforce unionisation. For 
example, the Department of Employment commissioned study of management responses 
to the industrial relations legislation of the seventies, which we referred to earlier, did little 
more than consider in a very ad hoc way the influence of plant size and the extent of union 
organisation in accounting for variation in the impact of the legislation at the establishment 
level. In this section we attempt to (i) organise (under appropriate sub-headings) and (ii) 
extend the range of potentially relevant influences beyond that nor1nally put forward in 
such studies. Accordingly, with a view to trying to provide a more systematic and com-
prehensive framework of explanation we put forward a model which consists of the follow-
ing three sub-sectors of variables: (i) variation in the incidence and extent of concern over 
the problem involved (in this particular case, health and safety matters); (ii) variation in the 
extent of union power; and (iii) variation in the personnel orientation of management. The 
potential value of this model was tested by trying to account for inter-industry variation 
in the extent to which the safety representative regulations had been invoked in their fust 
year of operation i.e. our dependent variable was column 4 of Table 2. 
Under the frrst sub-heading we seek to account for variation in the extent of concern 
over health and safety matters. In this regard the first variable that we employed was the 
industry accident rate which we saw as an important source of concern with health and 
• 
safety matters. The industry accident rate is important not only in its own right, but also 
because of its positive and significant correlation with other objective characteristics and 
behavioural manifestations of a poor quality working environment. In addition to the 
accident rate variable, we sought a variable that would constitute an institutional 
manifestation of the extent of concern with health and safety matters. The variable utilised 
for this purpose was the extent of the voluntary establishment of joint health and safety 
committees. These joint health and safety committees, which were established prior to the 
passage of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, are viewed as adaptive structures 
which represent an institutional response to a perceived problem of workplace health and 
safety. 
The simple existence of a problem of workplace health and safety will not necessarily 
guarantee a relatively rapid introduction of the safety representative regulations. The fact 
of the matter is that there are numerous detailed issues and potential problems that have to 
be resolved in the course of union-management discussions and negotiations before these 
regulations are likely to come into operation. The perspective adopted here is that union-
management agreement over such matters is likely to be substantially facilitated (i.e. such 
negotiations are likely to be significantly shortened), with the result that the regulations 
had been invoked during the period of time under examination in the presence of various 
sources and manifestations of union power. 
The resolution of partially conflicting union-management interests through the exercise 
of structurally based sources of power is central to the industrial relations paradigm, 
although the task of devising a fully comprehensive set of empirical proxies for the concept 
of union power is admittedly a far from straightforward one. The most widely used 
1 This section summarises results presented, and tested, in Beaumont (1981). 
A failure of voluntarism: the case of joint health and safety committees in Britain 73 
individual organisational proxy for union power has undoubtedly b~een the extent of work-
force organisation. This particular variable is held to measure the potential ·elasticity of 
substitution between organised and unorganised labour. Accordingly, we used collective 
agreement coverage as a measure of the extent of workforce organisation, hypothesizing 
that, the higher collective agreem·ent coverage for male manual work~ers, the more likely 
that the safety representative regulations would have b~een invoked in their first year of 
operation. 
Under this union power sub-vector we also need to consider th·e specific development of 
shopfloor organisation for collective bargaining purposes. The potential importance of this 
consideration follows from the gen~eral argument that the shopfloor has enjoyed substantial 
power gains in relation to both management and the official union structure in the 
relatively full employment environment of the post-war years. In a series of case studies 
one could seek to measure, or proxy, the extent of development of shopfloor organisation 
for collective bargaining purposes by reference to variables such as average shop steward 
constituency size, the ·extent of developm~ent of hierarchy within this body (e.g. appoint-
ment of senior shop stewards) the regularity of steward m~eetings, etc . However, as these 
particular variables are rarely available on a systematic industry by industry basis we had 
to utilise the nature of bargaining structure as a proxy for the extent of development of 
shopfloor organisation for collective bargaining purposes. The basic contention here was 
that th~e great~er th·e extent of single ~employer bargaining (conducted at the plant and to a 
lesser extent th~e company level), as opposed to multi-employer, industry level bargaining, 
the great~er was the extent and nature of union development and power at the shopfloor. 
And h·ence the more likely it was that the safety representative regulations would have 
been invoked during this period of tim·e. 
If on·e moves away from essentially organisational measures or proxies of union power 
to take a more behavioural orientated perspective then th~e particular proxy that has trad-
itionally been utilised for this purpose is the incidence or frequency of strikes. However, 
this particular variable has a number of potential limitations as a proxy for union power. 
In this regard one could, for example, argue that it may be th·e threat of a strike, rather 
than the actual carrying out of this threat, that is the really important dimension of union 
pow~er. If this is in fact the case then it is arguable that the unions in a really pow~erful 
bargaining position rarely have to go on strik·e; the simple threat to do so is sufficient to 
achieve their negotiating aims. A second possible limitation of strike frequency as a proxy 
for union power is that it does not take account of the fact that union power can be 
~exerted or manifested through oth·er means than strikes, such as go-slows, work to rules, 
overtime bans, ~etc. Despite these a priori reservations we followed traditional practice and 
entered strike frequency as a behavioural proxy for union power, predicting a positive 
sign on th~e variable. However, we did broaden the notion of the strike as a major 
instrument of union power by entering as a variable th·e working days lost dimension of 
strike activity. 
The implicit assumption underlying the sub-vector of union power variables outlined 
above is that the extent of management opposition to the relatively rapid introduction of 
the safety representative regulations was essentially a constant actross establishn}ents and 
industries. In practice, how~ever, it ·was almost certainly th~e case that not all managements 
were equally opposed to the introduction of these regulations, a fact that has obvious 
implications for the speed with which union-manag~ement agreement over their details 
was reached. Accordingly, the basic argument underlying the third and final sub-vector 
of variables outlined here is that those managements that accord personnel matters a 
relatively high priority in their decision making calculus will have been relatively disposed 
towards th~e introduction of the safety representative regulations. 
' 
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Under this third and final sub-vector we, firstly, entered establishment size as a variable. 
The use of the size variable as a proxy for the personnel orientation of management follows 
from the results of a number of studies which have indicated that larger plants devote 
proportionately more resources to their personnel management functioa tban their smaller 
sized counterparts, possibly because of the alleged non-pecuniary disadvantages of employ-
ment in the more structured, regimented environment of larger plants. As a second 
potential source of influence we need to take account of the traditional organisational 
development and change literature which has so strongly stressed the importance of the 
senior management role in the successful initiation of a change effort.ln keeping with our 
general line of argument concerning the importance of the extent of the personnel orienta-
tion of management in this process we hypothesized that where there was a person with a 
specialist responsibility for industrial relations and personnel matters present on the board 
or most senior level of decision making within the organisation then there was a significant 
likelihood of the safety representative regulations having been invoked during the period 
of time under scrutiny. The basic argument here is that where the personnel management 
function has attained such relatively high status within the management decision making 
hierarchy this has the effect of making the individual establishment's management 
especially conscious of, and responsive to, the provisions of industrial relations legislation. 
Finally, we entered a public sector dummy variable, hypothesizing that there was a 
significantly greater likelihood of the regulations having been invoked in industries pre-
dominantly or solely in the public sector. This expectation follows from the Government's 
acceptance of an obligation to act as a 'good employer' of labour in the public sector. This 
good employer obligation has frequently placed the public sector to the forefront of the 
process of introducing new institutional arrangements and structures in the industrial 
relations field in Britain. Accordingly, we hypothesized that this good employer influence 
in the public sector would have been at work in encouraging a relatively rapid introduction 
of the safety representative regulations. 
The correlation and regression results obtained indicated that the safety representative 
regulations were most likely to have been invoked in their fust year of operation in 
industries characterised by high accident rates, high collective agreement coverage, single 
employer bargaining, large sized establishments, establishments where there was a member 
of senior management specifically responsible for industrial relations and personnel matters 
and industries in the public sector. The strength of these preliminary results were such as to 
encourage us in the belief that the basic model outlined here could be usefully developed 
and refmed to consider the impact of legislation in other subject areas both in Britain and 
elsewhere. Certainly the basic framework of analysis, and individual hypotheses generated, 
would seem a substantial advance over previous, ad hoc discussions of the factors likely to 
influence individual firm response to industrial relations legislation. 
Conclusions 
The aims and content of this paper may be summarised relatively briefly. The paper 
took as its starting point one of the major changes in the British system of industrial 
relations from the 1970s, namely the substantially increased legal regulation of the system. 
One of the basic reasons for this change was identified by examining the failure of the 
attempt to bring about the satisfactory development of joint health and safety committees 
on a voluntary basis. This failure led directly to the passage of enabling legislation in 1974. 
The substantial impact of this legislation was then documented and we concluded by 
presenting a framework of analysis that seemed to have considerable potential for 
explaining variation among fir1ns in the response to such industrial relations legislation. 
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WE FOUND IT IN ~OUR FILES 
. . . the Minister of Labour (the Hon. T .P. Shand) . . . said . . . wh~en he 
addressed the Canterbury-Westland division of the National Party . .. 
"Th·e day we reach the stage that the Government lays 
down all the conditions of employment and wages to be 
paid for labour, it will have stepped over the boundary into 
the sort of Government that ends up in dictatorship." 
Christchurch Star 29 May 1963 
